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Disparate Impact, Federal/State Tension,
and the Use of Credit Scores By Insurance
Companies
By Ian O'Neill*

I. INTRODUCTION
Efficient markets rely on the free flow of information. In virtually every financial market, key sources of that information are
credit rating, credit reporting, and credit scoring companies. In addition, post-9/11 rules have made the use of credit reports for identity
verification an absolute requisite in virtually every type of financial
service transaction. Consider the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act's stricter
anti-money laundering provisions and prohibitions on extending
credit or financial services, including insurance, to any person listed
on the Office of Foreign Assets Control list.
Despite the prevalence of credit rating and reporting, there is
one area that is currently causing significant legal turmoil: the use of
consumer credit scores as an actuarial factor in pricing consumer insurance products. To date, forty-eight states have taken some form of
legislative or regulatory action to control or prohibit the use of credit
scores by insurers.' In addition, plaintiffs in Louisiana and Texas
have filed class-action lawsuits claiming that the practice is racially
discriminatory and unconstitutional. 2 Several state governments have
commissioned or completed significant studies looking into the issue
* Ian O'Neill is currently an associate in the business practice group of Holland and Hart LLP in Denver, Colorado. Mr. O'Neill graduated from the University
of East Anglia in the United Kingdom, with honors, in 1997 and holds a J.D., with
honors, a certificate in intellectual property law, and an LL.M in Financial Services
Law from the Chicago-Kent College of Law. For several years prior to joining
Holland and Hart, Mr. O'Neill was employed full-time by TransUnion, one of the
three national credit reporting agencies.
1
NAMIC ONLINE, NAMIC'S STATE LAWS AND LEGISLATIVE TRENDS: STATE
LAWS
GOVERNING
INS.
SCORING
PRACTICES
1
(2004),

http://www.namic.org/reports/credithistory/credithistory.asp (last visited Oct. 24,
2006). (Pennsylvania and Vermont are the only two states that do not address this
issue either by legislative or regulatory methods.)
2 Dave Kaiser, Credit-based Insurance Scoring Remains a Key Legislative,
Regulatory Issue, INS. JOURNAL 1 (November
http://www.insurancejoumal.com/magazines/southeast

tures/62355.htm (last visited October 24, 2006).

7,

2005), available at
/2005/11/07/
fea-
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at taxpayer expense. 3 Hawaii has already banned the use of credit
scores in pricing certain insurance products.4 Despite this opposition,
"90% of automobile insurance companies
nationwide, use credit
'5
scores as a means of setting rates."
This article examines the current legal turmoil surrounding
the practice of using credit scores to price insurance products. Part I
explains what a credit score is, how it is calculated, and the role it
plays in the insurance marketplace. Part II examines the legal background of this contentious practice, from its inception in 1970 with
the enactment of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, to the sudden surge in
related litigation and legislative action within the past thirty-six
months. Part III discusses the current debate surrounding the practice, including the most recent accusations that insurance scores constitute a novel form of "redlining" by insurance companies. These
problems are weighed against the many benefits of credit scoring.
Part IV proposes a solution based on federal preemption of state law.

II. AN INSURANCE SCORE PRIMER
A. What is a credit score and where does it come from?
A credit score or rating is a numerical calculation intended to
represent the specific level of risk that a person or entity brings to a
particular transaction. When used to rate businesses and financial institutions, credit scores predict factors such as financial stability, solvency, and risk of liquidation. In a similar manner, a consumer credit
score is calculated to represent the particular level of risk that the individual consumer poses in a commercial transaction. Three national
credit reporting companies maintain credit histories for more than
3 See, e.g., FRANK M. FITZGERALD, COMM'R, OFFICE OF FIN.
AND INS. SERV.,

THE USE OF INS. CREDIT SCORING IN AUTO. AND HOME OWNERS INS.: A REPORT TO
THE GOVERNOR, THE LEGISLATURE AND THE PEOPLE OF MICH. (2002)

www.michigan.gov/documents/ cis ofiscreditscoringreport_52885_7.pdf (discussing the use of credit history information within the scope of Michigan insurance laws and the Fair Credit Reporting Act).
4 HAw. REV. STAT. § 431: 10C-207 (2005).
"No insurer shall base any standard or rating plan, in whole or in part, directly

or indirectly, upon a person's race, creed, ethnic extraction, age, sex, length of driving experience, credit bureau rating, marital status, or physical handicap."
5

GOAPPLY.COM,

How CAN CREDIT SCORING AFFECT YOUR INSURANCE?

(2004), http://www.goapply.com/newsletters/20040715/insurance.cfm
April 30, 2006).

(last visited
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200,000,000 market-active adults in the United States: TransUnion,
Experian and Equifax. 6 These histories are compiled into credit reports. Credit scores are calculated by applying complex formulas,
also known as statistical models, to specific information contained
within the consumer's credit report.7 Unlike a traditional credit
score, which is designed to predict the likelihood that a consumer will
default on a financial obligation, an insurance score is designed to
predict the likelihood that the insured will file a claim within a specific window of time. "An insurance credit score is a three digit
number that represents a 'snapshot of that individual's risk level'
based on a person's credit history at a particular point in time." The
intent is that credit information can be put into a mathematical model
that statistically predicts the probability of the insured filing a claim
in the near future.
B. How insurers use credit scores
Underwriters have used credit information "for decades to
help ... decide whether to accept or reject applications for insurance. The Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") specifically authorized the use of insurance credit scores in 1970. As a result of recent
advances in scoring technology, the practice has become widespread
within the past few years. Today insurance companies use the scores
as one factor in determining "if [a carrier] will offer a consumer a...
residential insurance policy and how much to charge for the policy
offered." 9 Insurers use insurance scores "in a variety of ways-for
underwriting (including rating tier selection), rating (or premium development), coverage eligibility, marketing, and payment plan eligibility."' 0 Under the FCRA and its successor, the Fair and Accurate
Credit Transactions Act ("FACTA"), insurers may only use insurance
scores as one factor among many, including motor vehicle records,
http://www.transunion.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2006). (For more information on how the three national credit reporting companies compile information,
visit ,www.experian.com or www.equifax.com.
7 Fitzgerald, supra note 3, at 4-5.
6

8

CREDIT SCORING: THE TOPIc, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE

2 (2006),

http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/creditscoring/.
INS.

9 BIRNY BIRNBAUM, INSURERS' USE OF CREDIT SCORING FOR HOMEOWNERS
IN OHIO: A REPORT TO THE OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N 9 (2003)

http://www.cej-online.org/creditscoringmainpage.htm (follow "report for the Ohio
Civil Rights Commission" hyperlink) (last visited Oct 16, 2006).
'0 Id. at 1.
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loss reports, and driver characteristics such as age, marital status, and
vehicle usage."
C. Statistical Correlations-How credit data correlates to claim
risk
At the core of the use of insurance scores is a claim by insurers that credit performance closely correlates to the likelihood of filing an insurance claim.
A study by EPIC Actuaries used a nationwide sample of
nearly 2.7 million auto insurance policies to identify a correlation between an individual's insurance score and the individual's propensity
to file a claim on an auto insurance policy. 12 According to the EPIC
Actuaries' study, credit-based insurance scores were among the top
three most predictive risk factors for each of the six types of coverage
included in the study.' 3 EPIC found that as insurance scores increased, the average dollar cost of insurance claims decreased. 14 The
average dollar cost decreased in proportion to the decreasing number
of claims filed. 15 Specifically, EPIC found that for consumers with
lower credit ratings, the dollar cost of insurance losses was as high as
48% above average; in contrast, for consumers with high credit
scores, the dollar cost of insurance losses dropped to as low as 24%
below average.16
In November 2004, the Texas Department of Insurance released a study that examined claims performance in a sample of approximately 150,000 policies in Texas. The study found that the 10%
of consumers with the worst credit histories filed twice as many
claims as those with scores in the top 10%. 17 Specifically, the study

1 Fair and Accurate

Credit Transactions Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1681 (LexisNexis

2006).
12 EPIC ACTUARIES, THE RELATIONSHIP OF CREDIT-BASED INS. SCORES TO
PRIVATE PASSENGER

AUTO.

INS. Loss PROPENSITY 4, 29 (2003), www.ask-

epic.com/Publications/ Relationship%20of /o2OCredit%2OScores062003.pdf (last
visited May 1, 2006).
13Id. at 39.
14Id. at 32.
15 Id.

16id.
17TEX. DEPT. OF INS., A STUDY OF THE USE OF CREDIT-BASED SCORES BY INS.

CARRIERS (2005), http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/reports/pdf/credit05sup.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).

2007]

Use of Credit Scores By Insurance Companies

found that the average loss per auto policy for consumers with a
'worse' credit score was $325, while the average loss for consumers
with a 'better' score was only $175. For homeowners' insurance loss
ratios, the difference was even more significant: the average loss ratio
for consumers with a 'worse' score was more than 200% higher than
that of consumers with a 'better' credit score.' s Dividing consumers
into deciles by credit score, the Texas Department of Insurance found
that consumers in the lowest decile generated losses that were more
than double the losses generated by consumers in the top decile. 19
A third study conducted by the Casualty Actuarial Society
also identified a strong link between credit score performance and insurance losses. 2 The group's study separated consumers by credit
rating into four categories, ranging from those with unacceptable
21
credit (category A) to those with excellent credit (category D).
Those with the lowest credit ratings incurred losses 33% higher than
the average losses of all groups combined, while those with the highest credit ratings incurred losses 25% lower than the combined aver22
age.
The use of credit scores in the underwriting process is based
on three intuitive claims. First, the insurance industry claims that
credit scores are indicative of personal responsibility because "it is
intuitive and reasonable to believe that the responsibility required to
prudently manage one's finances is associated with other types of responsible and prudent behaviors, for example proper maintenance of
homes and automobiles and safe operation of cars., 23 Second, "it is
intuitive and reasonable to believe that financially stable individuals
are likely to exhibit stability in other areas of their lives." 2'4 Finally,
credit scores are claimed to be indicative of "financial stress [that]
IS

Id.

19Id.
20

Robert P. Hartwig, The Use of Credit Information In PersonalLines Under-

writing, INS. ISSUES SERIES, Vol. 1, No. 2, at 6, 16, available at
http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/creditscoring/ (follow "White Paper:
The Use of Credit Information in Personal Lines Insurance Underwriting" hyperlink). (last visited May 2, 2006) (discussing James E. Monaghan, The Impact of
Personal Credit History on Loss Performance in PersonalLines, Casualty Actuarial Society, 2000).
21Id.at 16.
22 Id.

231Id.at
24

Id.

11.
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could lead to stress, distractions or other behaviors that
produce more
' 25
"
maintenance.
home
or
car
of
losses, such as deferral
D. 2005 - Credit Scoring Makes News

Several highly publicized data breaches made 2005 an eventful year for the financial data reporting industry. Between February
2005 and March 2006 more than 56 million consumer credit files
were reported lost or stolen.26 This resulted from more than 100
separate data breaches. 27 As a result, credit scoring, credit reporting,
and data privacy became high-profile issues, both in terms of public
awareness and legislative activity. Due in large part to the public
outrage generated by these high-profile breaches,
credit scoring, in all
28
its forms, has come under increasing scrutiny.
Consumer groups have criticized the use of the scoring for insurance purposes. They argue that the practice constitutes an unnecessary risk to consumer privacy, and it is questionable whether credit
scores are an actuarially sound predictor of consumer claim propensity. 29 By identifying insurance credit scoring as a particularly vul-

nerable area and using it as part of a wedge strategy, consumer
groups have sought to introduce stricter laws prohibiting or restricting the use of credit scores at many levels. To understand these
strategies, it is first necessary to set forth a brief map of the legal
landscape that credit reporting and insurance companies must navigate and the relevant legal history.

25

Hartwig, supra note 20, at 11.

26 CHRONOLOGY OF DATA BREACHES REPORTED SINCE THE CHOICEPOINT

INCIDENT (2006) http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm

(last

visited May 1, 2006).
272005 DATA SEC. BREACH STATISTICS,

http://www.utimaco.us/secnews/data_

breaches/2005.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).

Record-High ChoicePointSettlement Emphasizes Need to Reassess Corporate Data-Security Programs, http://www.bryancave.com/pubs/pubdetail.
asp?id=1274 (last visited May 2, 2006).
28

29

Model State Clean Credit and Identity Theft Protection Act, § 9, at 28

(2005), www.uspirg.org/consumer/archives/PIRGCUCleanActnovO5.pdf
ited April 24, 2006).

(last vis-
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III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LEGAL

LANDSCAPE: FEDERAL STATUTES, MODEL
LAWS, STATE ACTION, AND CASES
A. The McCarran-Ferguson Act
Even though most insurance contracts transcend state lines
and clearly constitute interstate commerce, Congress preserved the
states' sovereign authority to regulate the business and taxation of insurance. This preservation of power dates back to 1945, when Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act ("MFA") "to insure that
the states [could] regulate the business of insurance free from the inadvertent preemption by federal statutes of general applicability."3 °
The McCarran-Ferguson Act created a general exemption for state
laws that regulate insurance from federal preemption. 3 1 The
32 Supreme
exemption.
broad
a
as
this
interpreted
repeatedly
has
Court
Just one year after Congress enacted the MFA, the Supreme
Court issued a strong ruling in favor of state sovereignty.3 3 The
Court concluded that in enacting the MFA, Congress had "throw[n]
the whole weight of its power behind the state systems" for regulat-

30

Standard Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. West, 127 F. Supp.2d 1064, 1067 (W.D. Mo.

2000) (quoting Autry v. Nw. Premium Serv., 144 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 1998)).
31 15

U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006).

§ 1012 Regulation by State law; Federal law relating specifically to insurance;
applicability of certain Federal laws after June 30, 1948
State regulation. The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein,
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or
taxation of such business.
Federal regulation. No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless
such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That after June
30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act [15
1 et seq.], and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the
USCS
Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade
Commission Act, as amended [15 USCS §§ 41 et seq.], shall be applicable to the
business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law.
32 Knutson, J. Haakon, Note, Credit Scoring in the Insurance Industry: Discriminationor Good Business, 15 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 315, 320-322, (2003).
33Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 430-31 (1946).
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ing insurance. 34 The Court softened this position somewhat in 1999
when it ruled that the MFA does not preempt claims brought under
the federal RICO statute. 35 In doing so, the Court articulated that the
MFA does not preempt generally applicable federal statutes "if the
federal law is applied in aid or enhancement of state regulation, and
does not frustrate any declared state policy or disturb the State's administrative regime.""
The Court has also emphasized that while "McCarranFerguson's overall purpose is to protect 'the business of insurance'

. . .

that ...does not necessarily include every activity in which

an insurance company might engage." 37 Specifically, to be exempt,
the state law must be an integral part of allocating the policyholder's
risk. The actual policy relationship between parties and the state law
must be limited to regulation of the insurance industry. 38 More specifically, the MFA is only intended to protect state insurance laws
from inadvertent preemption by federal laws of general applicability.
By its plain language, the MFA still allows for limited preemption by
federal laws provided that
39 the federal law "specifically relates to the
business of insurance."
B. The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970
The FCRA was enacted in 1970 and revised in 1996 to regulate the credit reporting industry. 40 Among other things, the FCRA
authorizes the use of credit reports and scores by insurance compa-

34

Knutson,, at 320.

35Humana,

Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 311 (1999).
36 Knutson, supra note 11, at 317(2003) (citing Humana, 525 U.S.
at 303).
37
Cynthia T. Andreason, Federal Preemption and the McCarran-Ferguson
Act: An Analytical Primer, 5 MEALEY'S EMERGING INS. DISPUTES, 1 (2000),
http://www.wrf.com/publication.cfm?publicationid= 1997, at Section III (last visited Oct. 24, 2006).
38 Standard Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. West, 127 F.Supp.2d at 1067.
39 The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1947, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1013(b) (2006).

(b) No Act shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or superseded any law enacted by any state for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which
imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the
business of insurance... (emphasis added).
4015 U.S.C.S. § 1681 (2006).
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nies to determine whether to issue a new policy, 4 1 to review rates for
existing policies, 42 and to take adverse action, such as canceling a
policy or increasing rates. 43 Although credit reports have been available to insurance carriers as an underwriting factor since 1970, it is
only within the past decade that insurers have really made use of
them. The explosive growth in the use of credit scores by insurers
"has been fueled by the introduction of more sophisticated analysis
tools and additional research indicating a strong correlation between
credit history and insurance risk.",44 The FCRA included several limited areas in which it explicitly preempted state laws. None of these
preemptions covered the use of insurance scores. In 2003, the
FACTA amended the FCRA.4 5
C. The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003
The FACTA amended the FCRA in response to pressing concems within the financial services and financial data industries. First,
concerns about data security led to the introduction of several new
consumer rights and more stringent requirements for data accuracy.46
Second, the FCRA included a limited number of state law preemptions.
The FCRA also contained a "sunset provision" stating that
these preemptions would expire January 1, 2004. Congress enacted
the FACTA "to make these preemptions permanent and to also add a

4115

U.S.C.S. § 1681(a).

4215

U.S.C.S. § 1681(b)(a)(3)(E).

43

1d.

44 Id.

45 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159,

117 Stat. 1952 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1996); 20 U.S.C. § § 9701-9708
(1992); and 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (2004)).
46
Gail Hillebrand, After the FACTA: State Power to Prevent Identity Theft, 17
Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 53, 53 (2004) (describing the new consumer rights
granted by the FACTA, including the right to receive a free copy of their credit report from each of the three national bureaus once per year).
4715 U.S.C. § 1681(t) (2004). The FCRA specifically preempts state law in the
following areas: uses of credit report of prescreen consumers for firm offers of insurance or credit, time and manner of resolving consumer disputes with regard of
accuracy, and duties of companies providing the data to the bureaus.
48
Id. (stating that the preemptions contained in § 624(b) & (c) "do not apply to
any provision of State law (including any provision of a State constitution) that (A)
is enacted after January 1, 2004").
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long list of new preemptions that significantly limit states' abilities to
regulate much of the FCRA's subject matter and conduct requirements., 49 The FACTA reauthorized the use of credit scores as an actuarial factor by insurance underwriters. 50 The FACTA did not in51
clude the use of insurance scores in its updated list of preemptions.
"Notwithstanding these broad preemptions, the FACTA does not
limit, annul or supersede state laws regulating the use of credit-based
insurance scores in insurance activities by any person engaged in the
business of insurance., 52 The FACTA does leave the door open for
future changes by specifically requiring that a government study be
conducted into "the effects of the use of credit scores and creditbased insurance scores on the availability and affordability of finanand services, including property and casualty insurcial products
53
ance."
D. The NCOIL and PIRG Model Laws
The National Conference of Insurance Legislators ("NCOIL")
is a national organization of state legislators with a stated mission of
"helping state legislators interface and communicate effectively with
each other and Congress." 54 In November 2002, NCOIL adopted a
new model law regulating the insurance industry's use of credit information. 55 The NCOIL Model Law specifically authorizes the use
49

National Consumer Law Center, Analysis of the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act
of
2003,
Pub.
L.
No.
108-159
(2003),
http://www.nclc.org/initiatives/facta/nclc-analysis.shtml#7
2006).

(last visited Oct. 25,

Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159,
117 Stat. 1952 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1996); 20 U.S.C. § § 9701-9708
(1992); and 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (2004)).
51 Kevin Fitzgerald and Brian Kaas, Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions
Act of 2003: Getting to Know the Facts about the FACT Act, Feb. 6, 2004,
50

http://www.foley.com/news/event-detail.aspx?eventid=305
2006).

(last visited May 2,

52 Id.
53 Id.
54 THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF INS. LEGISLATORS (NCOIL): HISTORY &

PURPOSE, http://www.ncoil.org; then follow "History and Purpose" hyperlink (last
visited May 3, 2006).
55 Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers of America, LB 487- Model Act
Regarding Use
of
Credit Information, 2003
Legislative
Session,
http://ne.iiaa.org/credit scoring billanalysis.htm (last visited, Oct. 26, 2006).
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of insurance scores as an underwriting factor, provided it is not the
sole factor and that it not be used at all in the limited circumstances
of a "no hit," which means that the consumer has no credit history at
all. 56 Additionally, insurers are prohibited from using any insurance
score that is calculated using income, gender, addresses or zip codes,
ethnicity, religion, marital status, or nationality as a factor.57 The
NCOIL Model Law also requires notification in the event that credit
information was the basis for an "adverse action."5 8 This notification
must explain the reason for the adverse action and include a descrip tion of up to four factors that were the main influences of the action.
Ostensibly, NCOIL is an independent association that conducts impartial studies and reviews to help state legislators regulate
insurance fairly and objectively. 60 At least one consumer group has
asserted that NCOIL is unfairly biased in favor of the insurance companies, including a claim in a 2003 study by the Consumer Federation
of America that twenty-three of the fifty-seven members of NCOIL
have some form of affiliation with the insurance industry. 6 1 Whether
NCOIL is truly impartial or not, there can be no question as to its influence. Forty-two states have enacted legislation based on the
NCOIL Model Law's restrictions on the type of data that can be used
to calculate an insurance score. 6 2 Twenty-seven states have approved laws that follow the basic NCOIL model, and twenty-four
states have "based the entirety of their current insurance scoring laws

56 INS. INFO. INST, supra note

8.

57 Id.
58

Id.

59 Id.
60

THE NAT'L

CONFERENCE

OF INS.

LEGISLATORS

(NCOIL):

HISTORY

&

PURPOSE, supra note 54.
61 NCOIL Stacked With Insurance Insiders, Says Consumer Group, Aug. 13,
2003,
http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/nationa/2003/08/13/31443.htm?
print=l.
62

NAMIC's

STATE

LAWS

AND

LEGISLATIVE

TRENDS:

STATE

LAWS

GOVERNING INS. SCORING PRACTICES, supra note I (listing states that have enacted
legislation or regulatory provisions that follow the NCOIL Model Law as: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
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on the NCOIL Model Act."63
For several years, the NCOIL Model Law was the only model
law available on the issue. As a result, several prominent consumer
groups accused the states of adopting NCOIL's pro-industry stance
by default rather than because it was good law. 64 In response to this,
along with other perceived failings of the 2003 FACTA, the Public
Interest Research Group and the Consumers Union of U.S., Inc.,
drafted an opposing model law: the CLEAN Credit and Identity Theft
Protection Act ("CLEAN Act").65 In contrast to NCOIL's position
that insurance scoring should be permitted but regulated, the CLEAN
Act proposes an absolute prohibition on the use of insurance scores.6 6
In support of this strict position, the CLEAN Act argues that the
NCOIL Model Act offers only sham protections. 67 Specifically, the
CLEAN Act claims "the NCOIL model authorizes [insurance scoring] so long as the scoring is not the sole criterion used. Since scoring is never the sole criterion used in underwriting or6ricing insurance, the bill offers consumers virtually no protection."
Prior to 2005, only a handful of states had adopted similar
provisions to those proposed by the CLEAN Act: Oregon, Maryland,
and Hawaii. The publicity generated by the 2005 data breaches has,
in part, prompted the introduction of bills in virtually every state that
closely mirror the CLEAN Act.6 9
E. State action regarding the use of credit scores for insurance
purposes
A majority of states now permit the use of credit scores by insurance companies. Forty-two states allow insurers to use credit
63Id. (listing states that have replicated the NCOIL Model Law in its entirety
as: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and
West Virginia).
6 BIRNBAUM,

supra note 9, at 4.

65 Abigail Mierzwinski, The CLEAN Credit and Identity Theft Protection Act:

Model State Laws (2004), http://www.pirg.org/consumer/credit/model.htm#clean.
66 Model State Clean Credit and Identity Theft Protection Act, supra note 29,
at § 9(A).
67

1d.

68

Id. (emphasis added).

69 Id
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scores provided they adhere to specific, limited prohibitions on certain uses or the use of certain negative credit factors. 70 Thirty-five
states require insurers to file insurance
scoring methodologies with
71
the state insurance department.
Five states have enacted outright prohibitions on the use of
credit scores by insurance companies: Georgia, Hawaii, Maryland,
Oregon, and Utah. Additionally, legislation is pending in several
states that would prohibit the use of credit scores as an insurance underwriting factor. In 2005, Michigan and Alaska both took steps to
prohibit the use of insurance credit scores. In both states, the prohibitions were overturned by judicial action. 72 The Michigan insurance
department is currently appealing its judgment. 73 In Florida, "the Financial Services Commission has voted to adopt a credit scoring rule
that would require insurers to prove, before they could use credit
scores, that
their use does not unfairly discriminate against specific
74
groups."
F. Pending State Bills
Between January 1, 2005 and March 2006, several states introduced and debated bills that would have prohibited or severely
limited the use of insurance credit scores, including Arkansas, Ari70

NAMIC's STATE LAWS AND LEGISLATIVE TRENDS: STATE LAWS GOVERNING
INS. SCORING PRACTICES, supra note I (listing specific states that permit use of in-

surance scores subject to limitations on certain negative credit factors as Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
71 Id. (listing specific states requiring insurance scoring methods to be filed
with state insurance department as: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia).
72
Mich.
Judge
Rules
Insurance
Scoring
Ban
Illegal,
INSURANCEJOURNAL.COM, April 26, 2005, http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/
midwest/2005/04/26/54272.htm.
71 CREDIT SCORING: THE TOPIC, supra note 8 (last visited Oct. 24, 2006).
74 Id.
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zona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Minnesota, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia. 75 Delaware
is particularly likely to pass prohibitions, as its commissioner is opposed to the use of credit scoring. 76 In December 2005, Minnesota
Attorney General Mike Hatch supported a ban on the use of insurance scoring for auto and homeowners' insurance by announcing legislation prohibiting the use of
77 credit histories for underwriting or rating by insurance companies.
G. Government studies into the use of credit scores in insurance
underwriting
In recent years, several states have concluded extensive studies into the issue of the use of credit scores in insurance underwriting.
Studies in Washington and Texas were the most extensive. In
keeping with the contentious nature of this debate, both proponents
and opponents of the use of credit scores have seized upon the findings of these studies to provide support for their causes.
The Washington study was required as part of newly enacted
state law ESHB 2544, restricting the use of credit scoring in personal
lines insurance underwriting. 78 The study's purpose was to determine
whether the use of credit scoring by insurers had an unequal impact
on specific demographic groups.7 9 According to the Insurance Information Institute, a pro-credit scoring industry association, the
Washington Office of the Insurance Commissioner concluded "while
there are statistically detectable patterns in the demographics of credit
scoring, most of the variations were due to random chance or other

75 NAMIC's
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THE TOPIC, supra note 8 (last visited Oct. 25, 2006).

77 Press Release, State of Minnesota Office of the Attorney General, State
Senator Larry Pogemiller, State Representative Joe Mullery and Attorney General
Mike Hatch Propose Fairness in Insurance Pricing Bill, (Dec. 29, 2005),
http://www.ag.state.nn.us/consumer/PR/PR_051229FairnesslnsurancePricing.htm.
78
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port,df.
79 Hartwig, supra note 20, at 7 (discussing state law ESHB 2544).
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facts." 80 The study also revealed that Asian Americans, the state's
largest minority group, clearly benefited from credit scoring.8 1 In
contrast, the Professional Insurance Agents of Ohio ("PIA") interpreted the study as showing a disparate impact on minority groups,
and argued that the results "indicate that the use of credit scores to
evaluate auto insurance risks can have an unequal impact on persons
82
who are younger, poorer and members of a racial minority group."
According to the PIA, "the Commissioner said the study found that
unequal effects of insurance scoring were too common to be random
events.., credit scoring 83is not blind to income and the jury is still out
on how it impacts race."
The Texas Department of Justice completed its own study in
2004 and issued its findings in a report in December of that year,
which it updated in January 2005.84 The Texas study found that the
use of credit scores "significantly increased pricing accuracy in predicting risk when combined with other ratings variables." 85 The
study also found that while blacks and Hispanics generally had lower
credit scores than whites and Asians, the results were not unfairly
discriminatory. 86 As a result, Texas Department of Insurance Commissioner Jose Montemayor recommended the continued use of
credit scoring to determine risk and insurance premiums. 87 In a January 31, 2005 letter to Texas Governor Rick Perry, Montemayor stated
that while the use of credit scoring may have a "disproportionate im80 KREIDLER, supra note 78.
81 Hartwig,

supra note 20.

82 Professional Insurance Agents Association of Ohio, Credit Study Indicates
Disparate Impact (Feb. 28, 2003), http://www.ohiopia.com/legislation/proaction/
proaction03/pa2-28 03.htm.
83 Id.
84 TEX. DEP'T OF INS.,

REPORT TO THE 79TH LEGISLATURE: USE OF CREDIT

(Dec. 2004), http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/reports/credit3.
html; then follow "Use of Credit Information by Insurers" hyperlink, see also TEX.
INFO. BY INSURERS IN TEX.

DEP'T OF INS.,

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TO THE 79TH LEGISLATURE: USE OF
(Jan. 2005),
http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/reports/credit3.html; then follow "Supplemental Report"
hyperlink.
85 CREDIT SCORING: THE TOPIC, supra note 8.
CREDIT INFO. BY INSURERS IN TEX.: THE MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

86

Id.

87 Jordan Smith, Insurance Commish Says Credit Scoring OK, AUSTIN
CHRONICLE, Feb. 11, 2005, available at http://www.austinchronicle.com/issues/

dispatch/ 2005-02-1 1/polsnaked3.html.
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pact" on some groups, the practice does have an "actuarially supported result" and as such is not "unfairly or intentionally discriminatory." Additionally, "credit scoring is not unfairly discriminatory as
defined in current law because credit scoring is not based on race, nor
is it a precise indicator of one's race. Ending the practice without a
corresponding change in law would likely lead to a prolonged court
battle. ' 8 8 In contrast to Montemayor's interpretation, a coalition of
organizations, including Texas Watch, League of United Latin
American Citizens ("LULAC"), Mexican-American Legal Defense
and Education Fund ("MALDEF"), NAACP, Texas Public Interest
Research Group ("TexPIRG"), Center for Economic Justice, Public
Citizen, Consumers Union, and Common Cause, took the position
that the reports established "that the use of credit scoring disproportionately impacts minorities and middle class Texans and that 8other
9
established rating factors are more predictive than credit scoring.
Finally, the Federal State Commission ("FSC") is currently
conducting its own study examining the impact of credit scores upon
the availability and affordability of insurance, as required by the
FACTA. 90 The FSC was scheduled to complete its study by the end
of 2005 and publish the results sometime in 2006.

H. Navigating the statutory landscape-relevant case law
To understand the contours of the debate surrounding the use
of credit scores by insurance companies, it is necessary to first understand two distinct lines of case law: the concept of disparate impact
and the circumstances in which federal law can preempt the MFA.
i. Disparate impact
The U.S. Supreme Court first established the concept of disparate impact in 1970 in response to a claim that an employer's requirement of a high school diploma or aptitude test for all but the

88 Id.

89 TexPIRG, House Committee Considers Legislation to Ban Insurance Credit
Scoring, Feb. 21, 2005, http://www.texpirg.org/TX.asp?id2= 16077&id3=TX&.
90 Robert Detlefsen, DisparateImpact Theory Provides No Support For Banning Credit Scoring In Insurance, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Vol. 20, No. 17 (Washington Legal Foundation), Apr. 2005, http://www.namic.org/pdf//050408WLF
CreditScoringDisplmpact.pdf.
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lowest paying jobs violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.9 The
plaintiffs alleged that this requirement disqualified black applicants at
a far higher rate than white applicants. 9 2 The Court ruled "[t]he Act
proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." 93 In doing so, the
94
Court established a threshold requirement of "business necessity."
Thus, the Court prohibited employment practices having an exclusionary effect if the employer could not show that the practices were
related to job performance. 9 5 One year later, the Court elaborated,
naming it "the business necessity test." 96 Under the business necessity test, "the business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to
override any racial impact, the challenged practice must effectively
carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve, and there must be
no available acceptable alternative policies or practices which would
better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it
equally well with a less differential racial impact." 97 The business
necessity test migrated out of case law and was granted statutory authority in 1991 when it was codified in the 1990 Amendments to the
98
Civil Rights Act.
Courts have generally been reluctant to apply the doctrine of
disparate impact to areas other than employment law. 99 In nonemployment cases where courts have distinguished from Title VII
disparate impact claims, courts have replaced the business necessity
test with "a much looser 'legitimate business justification' stan-

9 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 425-26 (1970).
92

Id at 424.

9' Id. at 431.
94 Id.

95 Id.
96 Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 796-97, (4th Cir. 1971).

at 798.
98 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat 1071 (1991)
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
9' Id.

"The purposes of this Act are...
(2) to codify the concepts of "business necessity" and "job related" enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in
the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642 (1989)."
99 Detlefsen, supra note 90, at 1.
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dard."' 10 0 In applying the disparate impact doctrine to the question of
whether a housing community's rule limiting the number of people
that could reside in a single dwelling violated the Fair Housing Act,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated that while
"mere insubstantial justifications" are not sufficient to satisfy the test,
"compelling need or necessity" is too high a bar because such a "degree of scrutiny would be almost impossible to satisfy."''
At least one court has outright rejected the argument that
credit scoring causes a disparate impact when used as a factor in underwriting insurance policies. In Owens v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas
rejected the plaintiffs claim that the insurance company used credit
information to intentionally discriminate against minorities.10 2 The
court determined that the "[d]efendant's use of credit information
was 'predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements' of underwriting and that absent its ability to determine risk using credit, its position in the market would suffer from competitive
adverse selection." 10 3 In addition, there were no other means by
loss and maintain competiwhich the insurer "could reduce risk 1of
04
tiveness in a less discriminatory way."'
ii. Federal law claims and the MFA
In 1946, one year after Congress passed the MFA, the Supreme Court affirmed that Congress intended to throw "the whole
weight of its power behind the state systems for regulating the business of insurance." ' 0 5 This did not mean that state insurance laws
were completely unassailable to federal claims. In 1999, the Supreme Court, in the contest of determining whether the MFA barred a
federal RICO claim, established that to be barred by the MFA, the
federal statute must not be one that "specifically relate[s] to the busi-

'00 Id.at 3.

101Mountain Side Mobile Estates P'ship v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56
F.3d 1243, 1254-55 (10th Cir. 1995).
102

Owens v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15701 (N.D.

Tex. 2005).
'0'
Id. at *14.

1°41d. at *15.
105
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. at 430.
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ness of insurance,"' 0 6 Thus if the federal statute at issue is not spe-

cifically related to the business of insurance, then application of that
statute is complementary to state regulation and does not frustrate any
declared state policy or disturb the State's administrative regime.
In Dehoyos v. Allstate, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit specifically addressed whether the MFA preempted federal
discrimination claims in relation to the practice of insurance credit
scoring. °7 Using the test established in Humana, the court ruled that
the MFA did not preempt a claim that the use of credit scores by the
Allstate Indemnity Company violated the anti-discrimination measures of the federal Fair Housing Act ("FHA")." °8 The court ruled that
while the FHA was not directly related to the business of insurance,
application of the FHA's provisions did not frustrate or conflict with
any articulated state policy or law. 10 9 Although the central claim was
based on a disparate impact theory, the court dismissed as "fanciful"
Allstate's claim that courts would be required to act as "super actuaries" in deciding each disparate impact claim on a case-by-case basis.1 10 Instead, the court focused its analysis exclusively on whether
the FHA was compatible or at least did not conflict with, an articulated state policy or law.'
Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the use of credit scores by insurance companies in
2005 in the consolidated cases of Reynolds v. Hartford Financial
Services and Edo v. GEICO."12 Specifically, the court was asked to
determine whether a failure to offer the best rate possible constituted
an adverse action, triggering the notice requirements of § 1681 et seq.
of the FCRA.1 3 The court ruled that providing anything other than
the best rate at the time of writing a policy as a result of credit data
was an adverse action and failure to provide an adverse action notice
106

Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S.at 307.

107 Dehoyos

v. Allstate Indem. Co., 345 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 2003) (Plain-

tiffs alleged that Allstate's practice of using credit scores to underwrite insurance
policies violated the anti-discrimination measures of the federal Fair Housing Act).
108

Id. at 297-99.

109

Id. at 299.

10

" Id. at 298.
" Id. at 299.
112

Reynolds v. Hartford Fin. Serv. Group, 435 F.3d. 1081, 1084 (9th Cir.

2006).
113

Id. at 1085.
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114
in such circumstances constituted a willful violation of the FCRA.
The determination of "willfulness" prompted immediate response
from industry commentators who claimed it "could open up personal
lines carriers to near limitless civil liability ... [because] ... any person who willfully fails to comply with the adverse action requirements is liable to each consumer for damages of not less than $100
and not more than $1,000"in each instance.A 5 However, the court issued a revised opinion in January 2006 that "essentially backed away
from an across-the-board finding of 'willfulness' and said that individual cases need to be reviewed by lower courts that have reviewed
the specific actions of the insurers."" 6 The Reynolds court did not
address the conflict raised by bringing a federal claim under the
FCRA against a practice that is central to the business of insurance.
In doing so, there is a strong presumption that the MFA does not necessarily preempt federal claims brought under the FCRA, at least not
in the Ninth Circuit.

IV. Understanding the debate-business and policy
arguments
Opponents of credit scoring raise several theories as to why it
is an inappropriate tool for pricing and underwriting insurance rates.
First, they allege that the link between credit history and insurance
claims is spurious at best. Second, credit scores purportedly enable
discriminatory practices that disproportionately target certain ethnic
groups. Third, the need for businesses to protect their proprietary
scoring models and techniques fosters secrecy and a lack of accountability. Fourth, it is alleged that insurance companies increase rates
to compensate for the discounts offered for good credit scores, making those discounts a bait-and-switch tactic. Finally, detractors point
to potential inaccuracies or omissions contained in the underlying
data from which the scores are calculated. Few, if any, of these arguments withstand scrutiny.
4

Id. at 1083.
1.5Wes Bisset, CarriersFace Credit Score Setback: Ninth Circuit decision on
1

Insurance Scoring and Adverse Action Requirements, INDEP. AGENT
Aug.

18,

MAGAZINE,

2005, available at http://www.iiaba.net/IAMag/NewsViews/081805.

html.
116 Wes Bissett, Carriers Receive Potential Credit Scoring Reprieve: Ninth

Circuit Revises Decision on Insurance Scoring and Adverse Action Requirements,
INDEP. AGENT MAGAZINE, Feb. 2, 2006, http://www.iiaba.net/IAMag/NewsViews/

020206.html.
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Several opponents have argued that the link between credit
performance and insurance claims is spurious at best and fraudulent
at worst. In 2004, Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm claimed
"[t]here is no correlation between how well you drive and how well
you use your credit."'1 7 Sara Lapham claims credit scores merely
measure "claims consciousness," which is simply an assumption that
people with good credit scores are more likely to settle an accident
out of their own pocket rather than file a claim with the insurance
company. 1 8 Such allegations have been disproved by study after
study. In addition to the studies discussed above, a 1996 study by international actuarial consulting firm Tillinghast Towers-Perrin examined claim records from several insurance companies and found that
the probability of a statistically significant correlation existing between insurance scores and insurance loss ratios exceeded 92% and
was as high as 99%.119

The claim that credit scores promote discrimination is based
on the theory of disparate impact and redlining. The disparate impact
theory holds that a standard or practice is presumptively illegal if it
has the effect of disproportionately excluding members of legally
protected groups even though the challenged practice makes no reference to race or ethnicity,120and even though the resulting adverse group
impact was inadvertent.
The underlying premise of the disparate
impact theory is that credit scores may neither intentionally target
any groups for exclusion, nor use the methodologies to calculate
those credit scores that are inherently unfair to low-income and minority consumers. Allegedly, insurance credit scores penalize even
the most fiscally responsible low-income consumers because "the absence of positive credit information [such as a home mortgage] may
lower a score just as much as the presence of negative information. '' 12 1 In addition, it is alleged that insurance credit scores potentially penalize the use of cash or money orders to pay bills, a practice

117
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more common in low-income groups.122
Redlining is a practice whereby insurers "would literally or
figuratively draw a red line around certain geographic areas, and decline to [service] those areas on the basis of the racial composition,
age of the housing stock, or other factors, regardless of the creditworthiness of the individual loan applicants."'
This quote from the
Congressional record illustrates the absurdity of the redlining argument. While it makes for evocative and rousing rhetoric, the proposition that individual credit scoring is tantamount to redlining because
it affects minorities as a group regardless of their individual creditworthiness constitutes circular logic at best.
Credit scores are based on complex and highly proprietary
mathematical models. Because it is necessary to protect these models
as trade secrets, opponents of credit scoring argue that it is effectively
"a 'black box' because almost nobody knows how it works except the
people who invent it." 124 Opponents also "point out that there is no
uniform, industry-wide standard mathematical model for use in insurance credit scoring which makes it impossible for consumers to
know how a given insurance company will determine their credit
score." 12 5 The first point of this argument is unsupportable. A full in
camera inspection would be available to any litigant wishing to examine the model. Many states have followed the NCOIL model law
in this regard. While these states are required to protect these filings
as trade secrets against disclosure to competitors, regulators have full
access to any scoring model they wish to examine.l12 The second assertion that no uniform standard model for credit scoring exists was
largely eviscerated by the introduction of a new, shared scoring
122

Id.

123Cassity, Wendy, Article, The Case for a Credit Union Community Reinvestment Act, 100 Columb. L. Rev. 331, 364 (2000) (quoting 123 CONG. REC.
17630(1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire)).
124 Kathleen Pender, Insurance Credit Scoring Rankles, SAN FRAN. CHRON.,
May
12,
2002,
available
at
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/nw/?
postId=1457&pageTitle=Insurers'+credit+scoring+rankles
(last visited May 1,

2006).
125 Press Release, Office of The Governor, Governor, OFIS Commissioner

Propose Rule to Cut Base Insurance Rates by Banning the Use of Credit Scoring,
(April 26, 2004) (on file with author and available at http://www.cejonline.org/granholm%20press%20release%20cr/o2Osc%20ban%20040426.pdf
(last visited Oct. 19, 2006).
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model called VantageScore. According to TransUnion, one of the
three national credit bureaus, "VantageScore is the first-and onlyindustry model to be jointly developed by all three national credit reporting companies."' 12 7 The three bureaus collaboratively developed
the new model to create a uniform, consistent industry standard:
"VantageScore scores will be calculated the same way for each credit
bureau or lender." 128 It has even been argued that by using credit information in different ways, insurance companies are only competing
amongst each other, which creates more choices for the consumer.
The discounts offered to those with good credit have been attacked as illusory. The allegation is that insurance companies increased their overall base rates to recoup the cost of offering credit
score discounts. 130 According to Granholm, "the use of credit scoring.., has caused base rates to rise beyond what's affordable... especially those who do not qualify for any kind of discount. ' Even
assuming in arguendo that Governor Granholm's hypothesis is true,
more than 50% of consumers receive a discount as a result of having
good credit.' 32 According to the Fair Isaac Company, 76% of consumers have "good" or "fair" credit. 133 Supporters of insurance
credit scores also argue that "[w]ithout insurance scoring, many good
drivers and homeowners would pay more-sometimes much morefor coverage."' 134 The rationale is that the more information insurers
have at their disposal to assess risk, the more accurately they can set
rates and distribute the risk of loss. "If information is insufficient,
applicants for insurance may be placed in the wrong category. That
means good drivers will pay more for coverage.., subsidizing the
bad."' 35- Without credit scores to help insurers make more accurate
assessments of risk, policies would "not be priced according to the
127

Make Better Decisions with VantageScore, http://www.transunion.com/

vantagescore/#benefits (last visited May 5, 2006).
128 Holden Lewis, Credit Bureaus Create Alternative to FICO, bankrate.com,
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May 4, 2006).
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130
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risk of the individual.., but to average risk."'' 36 As a result, insurance "would be too expensive for low-risk [customers] and very
cheap for high-risk [customers].' ' 7
The accuracy of credit data is another area from which opponents of insurance credit scores draw ammunition. Michigan's insurance regulator, Linda Watters, claimed that 70% of credit reports
contain errors, of which 29% are so egregiously incorrect as to be unfair to consumers.1 38 A 2004 survey by the Public Interest Research
Group ("PIRG") alleged that 79% of reports contained some error.39
Of these errors, PIRG alleged that 25% were "serious."'' 40 Upon
closer analysis, it is apparent that such allegations are exaggerated.
Of the 79% of reports containing errors, more than two thirds were
minor, non-credit or confidential demographic information, such as
publicly known address or name, "that was misspelled, long outdated
or belonged to a stranger."'' 4' Consumers can dispute errors under the
FCRA and FACTA. Once a consumer files a dispute, "eighty perAlso,
cent... have their mistakes fixed within ten working days."
without the use of credit information to supplement motor vehicle records ("MVRs"), it is much more likely that insurance rates would be
inaccurate. According to a 2002 study, more than 20% of convictions for traffic violations in Connecticut and Florida are missed by
MVRs. 14 3 In some states, omissions more than doubled to 47% for
out-of-state convictions.' 44 In addition, different states follow different rules for recording offenses, creating an unreliable patchwork of
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data.
V. ANALYSIS
The use of credit scoring is an important practice that affects
virtually every person in the United States on some level. Despite
this, it remains an area of inconsistent application, with two primary
areas of unresolved tensions-federal versus state authority and consumer protection.
A. Federal and state authority
The FACTA and the FCRA explicitly permit insurance companies to use credit scores for the purpose of assessing risk and pricing insurance policies. The FACTA, however, does not necessarily
preempt state laws in this area. As a result, states currently use the
following argument to show that they are free to enact their own
rules, be it endorsing, limiting or outright prohibiting the practice.
First, they argue that the MFA specifically prohibits federal preemption of state insurance laws unless the federal law specifically relates
to the business of insurance. 145 Consumer groups have argued that
the FCRA and FACTA are strictly intended to regulate credit report1 46
ing companies and that any regulation of insurers is incidental.
Despite the certainty of consumer groups, the language of the FCRA
itself is not so clear. The purpose of the FCRA is "to require that
consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance,
and other information
in a manner which is fair and equitable to the
,,147
consumer ....
A second argument raised by states is that the FCRA, as
amended by the FACTA, includes several explicit preemptions of
state law. It is argued that under "the doctrine of expression unius est
exclusion alterius ... the mention of some items in a list implies the
exclusion of other items not mentioned."' 148 Therefore, if Congress
did not explicitly include a state law preemption covering insurance
141 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2005).

146 Memorandum from D.J. Powers, attorney for the Center for Economic Justice, Preemption Questions Regarding Credit Scoring,

( March 31, 2003),

http://www.cej-online.org/ creditscoring mainpage.htm (last visited May 3, 2006).
147 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, supra note 11. (emphasis
added).
148Memorandum

from D.J. Powers, supra note 147, at 4.
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credit scoring, one cannot be implied. Several federal courts have
recognized claims based on the FCRA for the use of credit scoring.
In addition to Reynolds, as discussed earlier, the Fifth Circuit held
that the FCRA gives insurers the right to use credit scores. 149 The
court did not address whether a state can take away this right under
its own laws. Reynolds notwithstanding, as the FCRA is currently
written, even with the FACTA amendments, an insurance carrier
would be in a weak position if it were to attempt to sustain a defense
based solely on federal preemption. To prevail on such an argument,
an insurance carrier would need a sympathetic court to make several
novel and controversial decisions with regard to multiple issues.
i. Consumer protection
The second argument is that of consumer protection and benefit. Opponents of credit scoring argue that it adversely impacts certain groups of consumers. This argument ignores the overwhelming
wealth of studies establishing that the majority of consumers benefit
from the use of credit scores, and that "while banning the use of
credit scoring might lower the cost of insurance for some, it would
most certainly increase the cost for many."' 150 Credit scoring is facially neutral and is alleged to impact minority groups only because
they generally have lower credit scores. To compensate for this practice would mean penalizing the vast majority of consumers, including
the large numbers of minority policyholders who benefit from having
a good credit history. Prohibiting the use of credit scores would not
change the overall amount of claims an insurer receives; it will only
change the manner in which the insurer could apportion that cost between customers. The effect of prohibiting credit scoring would be to
handicap an insurer's ability to allocate risk, forcing it to make more
sweeping, and less fair, assumptions. Credit scoring is inherently focused on the individual, not on group generalizations.
Transparency is central to the use of credit scores. Any type
of "black box" is inherently unfair and also inaccurate. The NCOIL
Model Act requires that all insurers file a description of any credit
model they use with the state department of insurance. The majority
of state laws follow the NCOIL Model Act. The problem is that insurance credit scoring is currently in limbo between the outer limits
of the FCRA and the individual whims of various state laws. The re149Wilting v. Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 227 F.3d 474 (5th Cir. Tex.

2000).
150How Can Credit Scoring Affect Your Insurance?,supra note 5.
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suit is a confusing patchwork of standards that obfuscates the issue
and hinders transparency.
To demonstrate this, consider the following hypothetical.
Policyholder, who has good credit, resides in Illinois, which for the
purpose of this scenario allows insurers to use credit scoring. As a
result, Policyholder receives multiple discounts. Policyholder happens to reside within a few miles of the Indiana state border, which
for the purposes of this scenario prohibits credit scoring. Policyholder moves to a comparable town just across the border in Indiana.
Policyholder's new town has identical crime statistics and demographics. Policyholder drives the exact same number of miles each
day and commutes to Chicago. Policyholder keeps the same insurance policies with the same insurer but Policyholder's rates increase
significantly. Virtually nothing has changed between the two locations; the only cause for the increase is that Policyholder is no longer
entitled to any discounts. This hypothesis can also be reversed, and
Policyholder may pay higher rates because of a poor credit rating and
receive lower rates upon moving to a state where credit rating information is prohibited. Unless Policyholder is educated in methods of
legal research and familiar with both the state insurance laws and the
means to access Department of Insurance records, the reason for the
disparity of rates naturally appears to be capricious and arbitrary.
ii. Conclusion
Credit scoring for purposes of pricing and underwriting insurance products will remain a contentious issue so long as the practice
is inconsistently applied among the varying states. The use of insurance credit scores provides underwriters with a valuable tool for more
fairly allocating risk and apportioning costs. The fact that it has a
disproportionate impact on certain groups is not equal to disparate
impact. Transparency issues are also compounded by the confusing
patchwork of state laws. The FCRA does not preempt the MFA in
this area as currently written. It will be necessary within the near future for Congress to address this shortcoming and specifically to extend the FCRA's preemptions of state law to this practice. Only by
enforcing uniform, national standards can the "black box" be opened
and the benefits of the practice be fully realized by the majority of
American consumers. The recent movement by the three national
credit reporting companies to standardize the scoring models they offer is a significant step toward uniformity, but ultimately Congress
will need to act to resolve this issue. The completion of an independent study of the issue by the FTC, as required by the FACTA, should
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go a long way toward validating the actuarial soundness of this practice.

